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PERSONAL PROPERTY AND SALES-
1954 TENNESSEE SURVEY
CLYDE L. BALL*
This article is limited to cases involving transfers of personal prop-
erty by gift or by sale, and the resultant legal relationships. Cases
involving liens on personal property, chattel mortgages, and those
dealing with sales in bulk are discussed in the article on Creditois'
Rights and Security Transactions in this Survey.'
PERSONAL PROPERTY
Gifts: Two cases during the Survey period dealt with the require-
ment of delivery in making gifts inter vivos. In Collins v. Alexander'
the facts were these: Prior to his death in 1950 Walker lived with Miss
Collins, a niece of his deceased wife. Miss Collins, who was fifty years
old, had lived in the Walker home since infancy, and she occupied the
position of a daughter in the home. Walker rented a lock box at the
bank; both he and Collins had a key to the box, and both placed their
valuables in it; in the last few years of his life, because of his physical
infirmities, Walker entrusted his key to Collins, and she took care of
his business affairs. Some two years before his death Walker ap-
parently purposed to make a gift of certain stocks to Collins. He en-
dorsed the certificates to her, his endorsement was witnessed, and he
placed the certificates in an envelope marked "To be given to Miss
Doris Collins at my death." The envelope was placed in the lock box
by a third party, and nothing was ever said by Walker to Collins con-
cerning it. Collins saw the envelope repeatedly on her visits to the
box, but she never inquired. as to its meaning or contents. Stock and
cash dividends on the stock represented by the endorsed certificates
were received by Walker and treated as his own. Upon Walker's death,
his executrix took possession of his effects, including the envelope in
question, and sued for a declaratory judgment to determine who owned
the shares. It seems clear that delivery so as to effectuate a gift inter
vivos never occurred. Attorneys for Collins argued unsuccessfully
that the Uniform Stock Transfer Act3 placed the burden of proof on
the estate to prove that Miss Collins as endorsee did not have title to
the stock. The court properly ruled that endorsement without delivery
conveys no title to a negotiable instrument, so that under either theory
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1. Hartman, Creditors' Rights and Security Transactions-1954 Tennessee
Survey, supra p. 799.
2. 260 S.W.2d 414 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1952).
3. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4094 et seq. (Williams 1934).
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the failure to deliver would defeat Collins. In a lengthy opinion by
the late Judge Anderson, the Court of Appeals sets out two tests to
determine whether or not delivery has taken place: (1) Could the
donee maintain an action against the donor for possession of the
property? (2) If the donor should retake the property without the
consent of the donee, would the donor be answerable in damages as a
trespasser? Unquestionably the answer to both questions was in the
negative in the Collins case.
If lawyers were permitted to advertise, this case would provide the
basis for an impressive sales talk. For here the intention to give was
clearly established; the moral right to receive the gift clearly appears;
but because the donor failed to satisfy the requirements of a valid
delivery the gift failed. Some kind of educational campaign is needed
to convince the public that a half-hour's conference with a competent
lawyer can avoid such unnecessary frustration.
The second gift-delivery case was Pamplin v. Satterfield.4 There the
complainant claimed to be the owner of a diamond ring by gift from
her mother-in-law. Complainant alleged, and so far as appears the
allegations was undisputed, that her mother-in-law made a gift of the
ring; but that since complainant already had a desirable ring, com-
plainant insisted that the donor retain the ring and wear it until her
death. Apparently no actual delivery, even for an instant, took place,
though complainant stated that from that time on all parties recog-
nized that the donor was wearing the ring as "agent or trustee" of the
donee-complainant. At the mother-in-law's death her 'husband took
the ring and the "trustee" arrangement continued by mutual agree-
ment, the husband now wearing the ring. At his death his son gave the
ring to the son's wife, and complainant instituted suit.
Perhaps there is no single rule of law that is more universally
honored thanl that which states that there can be no parol gift of a
chattel capable of manual tradition without a delivery thereof.5 As
Justice Burnett points out, there must be a relinquishment of dominion
and control over the chattel in order to constitute a delivery. Of
course, once a valid gift has been properly consummated, the donee
can redeliver to the original donor, who will hold as bailee, agent,
trustee, or in whatever capacity the parties intend. But under the
rule of the Pamplin case the original owner cannot change his status
from owner to bailee or trustee by expressing a clear intention to make
a gift, unless some kind of delivery takes place.
4. 265 S.W.2d 886 (Tenn. 1954).
5. BziowN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 38 (1936); Atchley v. Rimmer, 148 Tenn.
303, 255 S.W. 366, 30 A.L.R. 1481 (1923); O'Brien v. Waggoner, 20 Tenn. App.




There was a complete dearth of absolute sales cases during the Sur-
vey period. One case arose under the Bulk Sales Statute, and it is
discussed elsewhere in this Survey.6 One other case perhaps deserves
mention. In Lillard v. Yellow Mfg. Acceptance Corporation7 the plain-
tiff was the assignee of a conditional vendor of an automobile in
Georgia where the conditional sales contract was duly recorded. The
conditional vendee, with the permission of plaintiff, assigned his inter-
est in the chattel to X. Without the knowledge or consent of the plain-
tiff the automobile was removed to Tennessee and the original vendee
had applied for a title certificate in Tennessee without disclosing the
existence of the conditional seller's lien. Creditors of the original ven-
dee attached the automobile. X brought a replevin action which was
settled and dismissed. Plaintiff then brought this replevin action to
recover the car from the sheriff, the vendee being in default in pay-
ments under the contract. With the exception of a somewhat involved
procedural tangle, the case offers nothing unusual or unexpected. The
court held that the Motor Vehicle Title and Registration Act8 in no
way affected the priority rights of an out-of-state lienholder whose
lien was duly recorded; certainly there is nothing in the statute to
warrant a contrary conclusion. The court also rejected the contention
that the act of a conditional vendee or his assignee in suffering the
vehicle to be attached, or in dismissing a replevin action to recover
it, could in any way prejudice the rights of the conditional vendor
when he was in no sense a party to the proceedings. The concept of
res judicata simply does not lend itself to any other interpretation.
6. The case is Bradas & Gheens, Inc. v. Brewer 195 Tenn. 139, 258 S.W.2d
734 (1953), discussed in detail in Hartman, Creditors' Rights and Security
Transactions-1954 Tennessee Survey, supra p. 000 at 000.
7. 263 S.W.2d 520 (Tenn. 1953).
8. TEN. CoDE ANN. §§ 5538. 101-5538. 197 (Williams Supp. 1952).
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